Mutazila
(Arabic المعتزلة al-mu`tazilah) is a theological
school of thought within Islam. Mutazila were also known as
Ahl al-Tawhid wa al-'Adl (People of Divine
Unity and Justice). The name Mu'tazili is thought to
originate from the Arabic root اعتزل (i`tazala)
meaning "to leave", "to withdraw".
Origin
Mu'tazili
theology originated in the 8th century in Basra (Iraq) when
Wasil ibn Ata (d. 131 A.H./748 A.D.) left the teaching
lessons of al-Hasan al-Basri after a theological dispute
regarding the issue of Al-Manzilah bayna al-Manzilatayn
(described below); thus he and his followers, including 'Amr
ibn 'Ubayd (d. 144 A.H./ 761 A.D.), were labelled Mu'tazili
[1]. Later, Mu'tazilis called themselves Ahl al-Tawhid
wa al-'Adl ("People of Divine Unity and Justice")
based on the theology they advocated, which sought to ground
Islamic creedal system in reason.
Though Mu'tazilis relied on logic and different aspects of
Greek philosophy, the truths of Islam were their starting
point and ultimate reference [2]. The accusations leveled
against them by rival schools of theology that they gave
absolute authority to extra-Islamic paradigms reflect more
the fierce polemics between various schools of theology than
any objective reality. For instance, Mu'tazilis adopted
unanimously the doctrine of creation ex nihilo, contrary to
the Muslim philosophers who, with the exception of al-Kindi,
believed in the eternity of the world in some form or
another [3]. It was the philosophers, not the Muslim
theologians generally speaking, who took Greek philosophy as
the starting point and the master conceptual framework for
analyzing and investigating reality.
From early days of Islamic civilization, and because of both
internal factors including intra-Muslim conflicts and
external factors including interfaith debates, several
questions were being debated by Muslim theologians, such as
whether the Qur'an was created or eternal, the Mu'tazili
believed the Quran was created over time and revealed on a
day to day basis, whether evil was created by God, the issue
of predestination versus free will, whether God's attributes
in the Qur'an were to be interpreted allegorically or
literally, etc. Mu'tazili thought attempted to address all
these issues.
Tenets
Mu'tazili
tenets focus on the Five Principles:
(1)
Al-Tawhid التوحيد - Divine Unity.
Mu'tazilis believed in the
absolute unity and oneness of God. In this regard, they are
no different from the overwhelming majority of Muslims.
Nevertheless, the different Muslim schools of theology have
differed as to how to uphold Divine unity in a way that is
consistent with the dictates of both scripture and sound
reasoning — a task that is extremely sophisticated given
that God is ontologically different and categorically
distinct from nature, humans, and material causality. All
attempts to talk about the Divine face the severe, perhaps
utterly insurmountable, barrier of using limited human
language to conceptualize the Transcendent.
One example: All Muslim schools of theology faced the
dilemma of affirming Divine transcendence and Divine
attributes, without falling into anthropomorphism on the one
hand, or emptying Divine attributes, mentioned in scripture,
of any concrete meaning on the other [4]. The Mu'tazili way
of doing this was to deny the existence of attributes
distinct from Divine essence. In other words, God is, for
instance, omniscient, but He knows through His essence
rather than by having separate knowledge apart from Him.
This assertion was to avoid the multiplicity of co-eternals
— something that may impugn the absolute unity and oneness
of God, according to Mu'tazilis. In addition, they resorted
to metaphorical interpretations of Qur'anic verses or
Prophetic reports with seemingly anthropomorphic content.
Many other Muslim theologians did the exact same thing.
Others opted for either abstaining from making judgments
concerning these texts, or to affirm them "without knowing
how."
The doctrine of Tawhid in the words of the Mu’tazili
prominent scholar, chief justice Abd al-Jabbar ibn Ahmed (d.
415 A.H./1025 A.D.), in an original Mu’tazili work
translated in Martin et al. (1997): It is the knowledge that
God, being unique, has attributes that no creature shares
with Him. This is explained by the fact that you know that
the world has a creator (sani`) who created it and that: He
existed eternally in the past and He cannot perish (fana'),
while we exist after being non-existent, and we can perish.
And you know that He was and is eternally all-powerful (qadir)
and that impotence (al`ajz) is not possible for Him. And you
know that He is omniscient of the past and present and that
ignorance (jahl) is not possible for Him. And you know that
He knows everything that was, everything that is, and how
things that are not would be if they were. And you know that
He is eternally in the past and future living, and that
calamities and pain are not possible for Him. And you know
that He sees visible things (mar'iyat), and perceives
perceptibles, and that He does not have need of sense
organs. And you know that He is eternally past and in future
sufficient (ghani) and it is not possible for Him to be in
need. And you know that He is not like physical bodies, and
that it is not possible for Him to get up or down, move
about, change, be composite, have a form, limbs and body
members. And you know that He is not like the accidents of
motion, rest, color, food or smells. And you know that He is
One throughout eternity and there is no second beside Him,
and that everything other than He is contingent, made,
dependent (muhtaj), structured (mudabbar), and governed by
someone/thing else. Thus, if you know all of that you know
God's unicity.
(2)
Al-'Adl العدل - Divine Justice.
Facing the problem of existence
of evil in the world, the Mu'tazilis pointed at the free
will of human beings, so that evil was defined as something
that stems from the errors in human acts. God does no evil,
and he demands not from any human to perform any evil act.
If man's evil acts had been from the will of God, then
punishment would have been meaningless, as man performed
God's will no matter what he did. Mu'tazilis did not deny
the existence of suffering that goes beyond human abuse and
misuse of their free will granted to them by God. In order
to explain this type of "apparent" evil, Mu'tazilis relied
on the Islamic doctrine of taklif — that life is a test for
beings possessing free will, i.e., the capacity for choice.
Humans are required to have belief, iman, faith and
conviction in and about God, and do good works, amal, to
have iman reflected in their moral choices, deeds, and
relationship with God, fellow humans, and the earth. If
everyone is healthy and wealthy, then there will be no
meaning for the obligations imposed on humans to, for
example, be generous, help the needy, and have compassion
for the deprived and trivialized. The inequalities in human
fortunes and the calamities that befell them are, thus, an
integral part of the test of life. Everyone is being tested.
The powerful, the rich, and the healthy are required to use
all their powers and privileges to help those who suffer and
to alleviate their suffering. In the Qiyamah (Judgment Day),
they will be questioned about their response to Divine
blessings and bounties they enjoyed in their lives. The less
fortunate are required to patiently persevere and are
promised a compensation for their suffering that, as the
Qur'an puts it in 39:10, is "without measure."
The test of
life is specifically for adults in full possession of their
mental faculties. Children may suffer, and are observed to
suffer, given the nature of life but they are believed to be
completely free from sin and liability. Divine justice is
affirmed through the theory of compensation. All sufferers
will be compensated. This includes non-believers and, more
importantly, children who are destined to go to Paradise.
The doctrine
of 'Adl in the words of 'Abd al-Jabbar [5]: It is the
knowledge that God is removed from all that is morally wrong
(qabih) and that all His acts are morally good (hasana).
This is explained by the fact that you know that all human
acts of injustice (zulm), transgression (jawr), and the like
cannot be of His creation (min khalqihi). Whoever attributes
that to Him has ascribed to Him injustice and insolence
(safah) and thus strays from the doctrine of justice. And
you know that God does not impose faith upon the unbeliever
without giving him the power (al-qudra) for it, nor does He
impose upon a human what he is unable to do, but He only
gives to the unbeliever to choose unbelief on his own part,
not on the part of God. And you know that God does not will,
desire or want disobedience. Rather, He loathes and despises
it and only wills obedience, which He wants and chooses and
loves. And you know that He does not punish the children of
polytheists (al-mushrikin) in Hellfire because of their
fathers' sin, for He has said: “Each soul earns but its own
due” (Qur'an 6:164); and He does not punish anyone for
someone else's sin because that would be morally wrong
(qabih), and God is far removed from such. And you know that
He does not transgress His rule (hukm) and that He only
causes sickness and illness in order to turn them to
advantage. Whoever says otherwise has allowed that God is
iniquitous and has imputed insolence to Him. And you know
that, for their sakes, He does the best for all of His
creatures, upon whom He imposes moral and religious
obligations (yukallifuhum), and that He has indicated to
them what He has imposed upon them and clarified the path of
truth so that we could pursue it, and He has clarified the
path of falsehood (tariq l-batil) so that we could avoid it.
So, whoever perishes does so only after all this has been
made clear. And you know that every benefit we have is from
God; as He has said: “And you have no good thing that is not
from Allah” (Qur'an 16:53); it either comes to us from Him
or from elsewhere. Thus, when you know all of this you
become knowledgeable about God's justice.
(3)
Al-Wa'd wa al-Wa'id الوعد و الوعيد - Promise and Threat.
This comprised
questions on the Last day and the Qiyamah (Islamic Day of
Judgment). According to 'Abd al-Jabbar (Martin et al.,
1997): The doctrine of irreversible Divine promises and
threats is the knowledge that God promises recompense
(al-thawab) to those who obey Him and He threatens
punishment to those who disobey Him. He will not go back on
His word, nor can He act contrary to His promise and threat
nor lie in what He reports, in contrast to what the
Postponers (Murjites) hold.
(4)
Al-Manzilah bayna al-Manzilatayn المنزلة بين المنزلتين -
the intermediate position.
That is, Muslims who commit
grave sins and die without repentance are not considered as
mu'mins (believers), nor are they considered kafirs
(non-believers), but in an intermediate position between the
two. The reason behind this is that a mu'min is, by
definition, a person who has faith and conviction in and
about God, and who has his/her faith reflected in his/her
deeds and moral choices. Any shortcoming on any of these two
fronts makes one, by definition, not a mu'min. On the other
hand, one does not become a non-believer, for this entails,
inter alia, denying the Creator — something not necessarily
done by a committer of a grave sin. The fate of those who
commit grave sins and die without repentance is Hell. Hell
is not considered a monolithic state of affairs but as
encompassing many degrees to accommodate the wide spectrum
of human works and choices. Consequently, those in the
intermediate position, though in Hell, would have a lesser
punishment because of their belief and other good deeds.
Mu'tazilites adopted this position as a middle ground
between Kharijites and Murjites. In the words of 'Abd
al-Jabbar, the doctrine of the intermediate position is
(Martin et al., 1997): the knowledge that whoever murders,
or fornicates (zana), or commits serious sins is a grave
sinner (fasiq) and not a believer, nor is his case the same
that of believers with respect to praise and attributing
greatness, since he is to be cursed and disregarded.
Nonetheless, he is not an unbeliever who can't be buried in
our Muslim cemetery, or be prayed for, or marry a Muslim.
Rather, he has an intermediate position, in contrast to the
Seceders (Kharijites) who say that he is an unbeliever, or
the Murjites who say that he is a believer.
(5)
Al-amr bil ma'ruf wa al-nahy 'an al munkar الأمر بالمعروف
و النهي عن المنكر - enjoining the good and forbidding the
evil. 'Abd
al-Jabbar said (Martin et al., 1997): Commanding the good is
of two types. One of them is obligatory, which is commanding
religious duties (al-fara'id) when someone neglects them
(dayya`aha), and the other is supererogatory (al-nafila),
which is commanding supererogatory acts of devotion when
someone omits to do them (tarakaha). As for prohibiting
evil, all of it is obligatory because all evil is ethically
wrong (qabih). It is necessary, if possible, to reach a
point where evil (al-munkar) does not occur in the easiest
of circumstances or lead to something worse, for the goal is
for evil simply not to happen. And, if it is possible to
reach the point where good (al-ma`ruf) occurs in the easiest
of circumstances, then preferring the difficult
circumstances would be impermissible. Similarly, God has
said: “If two parties among the believers fall into a
quarrel, make peace between them; but if one of them
transgresses beyond bounds against the other, then fight
against the one who transgresses until he complies with the
command of Allah; then, if he complies, make peace between
them with justice, and be fair: for Allah loves those who
act fairly” (Qur'an 49:9). Thus, prohibiting evil is
obligatory only if the view does not prevail that
prohibiting a particular evil would lead to an increase in
disobedience, and if a preference for what was harmful were
not predominant. If such a view does prevail, prohibiting
evil would not be obligatory, and avoiding it would be more
appropriate.
Historical
Development
Like all
other schools, Mu'tazilism developed over an extensive
period of time. Abu al-Hudhayl al-'Allaf (d. 235 A.H./849
A.D.), who came a couple of generations after Wasil ibn
'Ata' and 'Amr ibn 'Ubayd, is considered the theologian who
systematized and formalized Mu'tazilism in Basra (Martin et
al., 1997). Another branch of the school found a home in
Baghdad under the direction of Bishr ibn al-Mu'tamir (d. 210
A.H./825 A.D.).
As the number
of Muslims increased throughout the Muslim empire, and in
reaction to the excesses of rationalism, theologians began
to lose ground. The problem was exacerbated by the Mihna,
the inquisition launched under Abassid Caliph al-Ma'mun (d.
218 A.H./833 A.D.). Mu'tazilis have been accused of being
the instigators though it was the Caliph's scheme (Nawas,
1994; Nawas, 1996; Cooperson 2005; Ess, 2006). The
persecution campaign, regardless, cost them and theology in
general the sympathy of the Muslim masses.
By the end of
the ninth century, Mu'tazilis were subjected to vehement
attacks from the right (the traditionalists) and from the
left (the atheists, deists, philosophers, non-Muslim
thinkers, etc.).
In response
to the attacks, Mu'tazili theologians refined and made more
coherent and systematic their idea system. In Basra, this
task was accomplished by the father and son team, Abu 'Ali
al-Jubba'i (d. 303 A.H./915 A.D.) and Abu Hashim al-Jubba'i
(d. 321 A.H./933 A.D.). The two differed on several issues
and it was Abu Hashim who was to have the greatest influence
on later scholars in Basra, including the prominent Abd
al-Jabbar who became the most celebrated proponent of
Mu'tazilism in the late tenth and early eleventh century
(Martin et al., 1997). Mu'tazilism did not disappear from
the Islamic intellectual life after the demise of 'Abd
al-Jabbar, but it declined steadily and significantly. Many
of the Mu'tazili doctrines and methodologies, nonetheless,
survived in the other Islamic schools.
Theory of
Interpretation
Mu'tazilah
relied on a synthesis between reason and revelation. That
is, their rationalism operated in the service of scripture
and Islamic theological framework. They, as the majority of
Muslim jurist-theologians, validated allegorical readings of
scripture whenever necessary. Justice 'Abd al-Jabbar (1965)
said in his Sharh al-Usul al-Khamsa (The Explication of the
Five Principles):
|
“ |
قال
القاضى عبد الجبار المعتزلى فى كتابه شرح الأصول
الخمسة: إن الكلام متى لم يمكن حمله على ظاهره و
حقيقته، و هناك مجازان أحدهما أقرب و الآخر أبعد، فإن
الواجب حمله على المجاز الأقرب دون الأبعد، لأن المجاز
الأبعد من الأقرب كالمجاز مع الحقيقة، و كما لا يجوز
فى خطاب الله تعالى أن يحمل على المجاز مع إمكان حمله
على الحقيقة، فكذلك لا يحمل على المجاز الأبعد و هناك
ما هو أقرب منه |
” |
The hermeneutic methodology proceeds as follows: if the
literal meaning of an ayah (verse) is consistent with the
rest of scripture, the main themes of the Qur'an, the basic
tenets of the Islamic creed, and the well-known facts, then
interpretation, in the sense of moving away from the literal
meaning, is not justified. If a contradiction results from
adopting the literal meaning, such as a literal
understanding of the "hand" of God that contravenes His
transcendence and the Qur'an mention of His categorical
difference from all other things, then an interpretation is
warranted. In the above quote, Justice 'Abd al-Jabbar
emphatically mentioned that if there are two possible
interpretations, both capable of resolving the apparent
contradiction created by literal understanding of a verse,
then the interpretation closer to the literal meaning should
take precedence.
First Obligation
Mu'tazilis
believed that the first obligation on humans, specifically
adults in full possession of their mental faculties, is to
use their intellectual power to ascertain the existence of
God, and to become knowledgeable of His attributes. One must
wonder about the whole existence, that is, about why
something exists rather than nothing. If one comes to know
that there is a being who caused this universe to exist, not
reliant on anything else and absolutely free from any type
of need, then one realizes that this being is all-wise and
morally perfect. If this being is all-wise, then his very
act of creation cannot be haphazard or in vain. One must
then be motivated to ascertain what this being wants from
humans, for one may harm oneself by simply ignoring the
whole mystery of existence and, consequently, the plan of
the Creator. This paradigm is known in Islamic theology as
wujub al-nazar, i.e., the obligation to use one's
speculative reasoning to attain ontological truths. About
the "first duty," 'Abd al-Jabbar said (Martin et al., 1997):
It is speculative reasoning (al-nazar) which leads to
knowledge of God, because He is not known by the way of
necessity (daruratan) nor by the senses (bi l-mushahada).
Thus, He must be known by reflection and speculation.
The difference between Mu'tazilis and other Muslim
theologians is that Mu'tazilis consider al-nazar an
obligation even if one does not encounter a fellow human
being claiming to be a messenger from the Creator, and even
if one does not have access to any alleged God-inspired or
God-revealed scripture. On the other hand, the obligation of
nazar to other Muslim theologians materializes upon
encountering prophets or scripture.
Reason and
Revelation
The
Mu'tazilis had a nuanced theory regarding reason, Divine
revelation, and the relationship between them. They
celebrated power of reason and human intellectual power. To
them, it is the human intellect that guides a human to know
God, His attributes, and the very basics of morality. Once
this foundational knowledge is attained and one ascertains
the truth of Islam and the Divinity of the Qur'an, the
intellect then interacts with scripture such that both
reason and revelation come together to be the main source of
guidance and knowledge for Muslims. Harun Nasution in the
Mu'tazila and Rational Philosophy, translated in Martin
(1997), commented on Mu'tazili extensive use of rationality
in the development of their religious views saying: "It is
not surprising that opponents of the Mu'tazila often charge
the Mu'tazila with the view that humanity does not need
revelation, that everything can be known through reason,
that there is a conflict between reason and revelation, that
they cling to reason and put revelation aside, and even that
the Mu'tazila do not believe in revelation. But is it true
that the Mu'tazila are of the opinion that everything can be
known through reason and therefore that revelation is
unnecessary? The writings of the Mu`tazila give exactly the
opposite portrait. In their opinion, human reason is not
sufficiently powerful to know everything and for this reason
humans need revelation in order to reach conclusions
concerning what is good and what is bad for them.
The Mu'tazili position on the roles of reason and revelation
is well captured by what Abu al-Hasan al-Ash'ari (d. 324
A.H./935 A.D.), the eponym of the Ash'ari school of
theology, attributed to the Mu'tazili scholar Ibrahim
al-Nazzam (d. 231 A.H./845 A.D.) (1969):
|
“ |
فقال
قائلون: كل معصية كان يجوز أن يأمر الله سبحانه بها
فهي قبيحة للنهي، وكل معصية كان لا يجوز أن يبيحها
الله سبحانه فهي قبيحة لنفسها كالجهل به والاعتقاد
بخلافه، وكذلك كل ما جاز أن لا يأمر الله سبحانه فهو
حسن للأمر به وكل ما لم يجز إلا أن يأمر به فهو حسن
لنفسه، وهذا قول النظام |
” |
That is, there are three classes of acts. The first is what
the intellect is competent on its own to discover its
morality. For instance, the intellect, according to
Mu'tazilis, can know, independently of revelation, that
justice and telling the truth (sidq) are morally
good. God is under an ethical obligation to order humanity
to abide by these. The second class of deeds is what the
intellect can discover their inherent evil and ugliness (qubh),
such as injustice, mendacity, or, according to al-Nazzam as
reported in the above quote, being in a state of ignorance
of the Creator. God cannot but prohibit these. The third
class is comprised of the acts that the human intellect is
incapable of assigning moral values to them. These are only
known through revelation and they become known to be morally
good if God orders them, or morally wrong if God forbids
them. In short, the human intellect is capable of knowing
what is right and what is wrong in a very general sense.
Revelation comes from God to detail what the intellect
summarizes, and to elaborate on the broad essentials.
Revelation and reason complement each other and cannot
dispense with one another.
In the above
formulation, a problem emerged, which is rendering something
obligatory on the Divine being — something that seems to
directly conflict with Divine omnipotence. The Mu'tazili
argument is predicated on absolute Divine power and
self-sufficiency, however. Replying to a hypothetical
question as to why God does not do that which is ethically
wrong (la yaf`alu al-qabih), 'Abd al-Jabbar replied
(as translated in Martin et al., 1997): Because He
knows the immorality of all unethical acts and that He is
self-sufficient without them…For one of us who knows the
immorality of injustice and lying, if he knows that he is
self-sufficient without them and has no need of them, it
would be impossible for him to choose them, in so far as he
knows of their immorality and his sufficiency without them.
Therefore, if God is sufficient without need of any
unethical thing it necessarily follows that He would not
choose the unethical based on His knowledge of its
immorality. Thus every immoral thing that happens in the
world must be a human act, for God transcends doing immoral
acts. Indeed, God has distanced Himself from that with His
saying: “But Allah wills no injustice to His servants”
(Qur’an 40:31), and His saying: “Verily Allah will not deal
unjustly with humankind in anything” (Qur’an 10:44).
The thrust of
`Abd al-Jabbar's argument is that acting immorally or
unwisely stems from need and deficiency. One acts in a
repugnant way when one does not know the ugliness of one's
deeds, i.e., because of lack of knowledge, or when one knows
but one has some need, material, psychological, or
otherwise. Since God is absolutely self-sufficient (a result
from the cosmological "proof" of His existence),
all-knowing, and all-powerful, He is categorically free from
any type of need and, consequently, He never does anything
that is ridiculous, unwise, ugly, or evil.
The conflict
between Mu'tazilis and Ash'aris concerning this point was a
matter of the focus of obsession. Mu'tazilis were obsessed
with Divine justice, whereas the Ash'aris were obsessed with
Divine omnipotence. Nevertheless, Divine self-restraint in
Mu'tazili discourse is because of, not a negation of, Divine
omnipotence.
The Validity of
Tradition
In the
Islamic sciences, reports are classified into two types
regarding their authenticity. The first type is diffusely
recurrent (mutawatir) reports — those that have come
down to later generations through a large number of chains
of narration, involving diverse transmitters such that it is
virtually impossible that all these people, living in
different localities and espousing (at times radically)
different views, would come together, fabricate the exact
same lie and attribute it to the Prophet of Islam or any
other authority. A large number of narrators is not a
sufficient criterion for authenticating a report because
people belonging to some sect or party may have an interest
in fabricating reports that promote their agendas. The power
of this mode of transmission, tawatur, rests on both
the number and diversity of narrators at each stage of
transmission. On the other hand, the authenticity of the
second type of reports, those which do not meet the criteria
for tawatur, is considered speculative.
'Abd al-Jabbar
commented on the issue of reports saying (Martin et al.,
1997): Mu'tazilis declare as true all that is established by
mutawatir reports, by which we know what the
Messenger of God has said. And that which was narrated by
one or two transmitters only, or by one for whom error was
possible, such reports are unacceptable in religions (al-diyanat)
but they are acceptable in the proceedings of positive law (furu`
l-fiqh), as long as the narrator is trustworthy,
competent, just, and he has not contradicted what is
narrated in the Qur'an.
Thus, the
non-mutawatir reports are accepted by Mu'tazilis,
according to 'Abd al-Jabbar, when it comes to the details or
branches of law. When it comes to basic tenets, these
reports are not considered authentic enough to establish a
belief central to the Islamic faith. That is, the Mu'tazilis
main issue is with reports of speculative authenticity that
have a theological, rather than legal, content, when these
seem to contravene the definitives of the Qur'an and
rational proof. Since the doctrines that Mu'tazilis hated
most were anthropomorphism and unqualified predestination (Ess,
2006), it were reports supporting these and resisting all
hermeneutical attempts at harmonizing and reconciliation
that were criticized and rejected by Mu'tazilis.